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In relation to the gradual and steady introduction of the systemic perspective and of new public 
management techniques in innovation policy-making during the past decade, many countries in the 
developed and developing world have been substantially widening and deepening their innovation 
policies. The introduction of new and more sophisticated policy instruments (deepening) has been 
accompanied by an expansion of the realm of action for innovation policy (widening). The main 
argument of this paper is that this remarkable governmental activism and experimentalism raises 
important analytical questions about the conditions under which innovation policy contributes to an 
effective governance of the innovation system. Hence, this paper has two main purposes. Firstly, it 
characterises in an unambiguous way these two recent trends in innovation policy, problematising 
their possible effects on governance. And, secondly, it develops an analytical toolbox based on a 





1.- Introduction: The new governmental activism and experimentalism in innovation policy 
 
 
During the past few years, many countries have been widening and deepening their innovation 
policies in a remarkable way. Governments are becoming more pro-active in using deeper and new 
forms of policy intervention and in expanding their areas of involvement in order to accomplish 
large socio-economic goals. Confronted with enduring problems and challenges like securing job 
creation, sustaining economic growth, reducing carbon fuel energy dependence, protecting natural 
environments, coping with ageing societies, improving health systems, or addressing the new 
security and defence issues in the terrorism age, most developed governments are reverting to 
innovation policy as part of the solution. The same holds true for industrialised developing 
countries, also called late-comer economies, whose governments are widening and deepening 
innovation policies to tackle specific development-related problems like reducing poverty, creating 
jobs in the formal economy, upgrading human resources, building institutional capabilities, or 
improving health conditions. 
 
In many respects this widening and deepening of innovation policy can be seen as the result of a 
double process. Firstly, the ‘innovation system’ approach since the early 1990s (beyond of the neo-
classical lineal model) has emphasized the formal and informal institutional dimensions of the 
innovation process, has extended the notion ‘innovation’ encompassing not only product and 
process innovation, but also organisational innovation in the wide Schumpeterian sense (Fagerberg 
2005), and has emphasized the complex and intrinsically social nature of knowledge production, 
exploitation and commercialisation. The gradual widespread of this approach into policy-makers 
circles and its subsequent reflection in policy-making has been behind the widening of innovation 
policy – moving now beyond research-science and technology policies (Lundvall and Borrás 2005). 
Secondly, the introduction of new public management (NPM) techniques in the 1980s and 1990s 
has also affected innovation policy. Governments have been willing to experiment with the design 
of new forms of governmental action in the area of innovation policy, introducing for example 
decentralisation, contract-management, privatisation, public-private partnerships; and with the 
development and use of more sophisticated steering forms in programmes and schemes. New public 
management has invariably meant a deepening and a transformation of the forms of governmental 
action in innovation policy.  
 
This is to say that the widening and deepening trends of innovation policy have generally entailed a 
true experimentalism in policy-making. Many of the new policy measures that widen and deepen 
governmental action are genuinely new or are a significant adaptation of previous measures in a 
novel more expanded context. This experimentalism is observable not only in European countries 
and in the US (Shapira, Klein et al. 2001) (Biegelbauer and Borrás 2003), but also in late-comer 
economies in Latin America (Dutrénit and Katz 2005), Asia (Gu and Lundvall 2006) and Africa 
(OECD 2007). 
 
Before proceeding, one cautious caveat is necessary at this stage. The notions ‘widening’ and 
‘deepening’ are ideal types aiming to grasp analytically two interrelated trends that have been 
observable in recent developments of many (national, regional, international) innovation policies 
worldwide. Hence, these two ideal types are analytical constructs that serve the purpose of 
characterising this observable phenomenon, namely, the significant efforts in many countries to 
transform gradually the scope and form of public action fostering innovation processes. This is to 
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say that, analysts have to keep in mind the analytical purpose of using constructed ideal types. In 
this paper, the purpose is namely to ask about the effects of these transformations in the governance 
of the innovation system. It is also important to underline that this paper is far from assuming that 
the widening and deepening of innovation policy is a universal and a homogeneous phenomenon. 
There is in fact large variation across countries in terms of differences in style and approaches to 
innovation policy. And there is large variation in terms of the capacities and organisational features 
of the governments themselves. 
 
Having said that, however, this paper argues that some remarkable trends regarding innovation 
policy are indeed observable at a general level, both in a time-based and in a cross-country 
comparative basis. This is why the use of ideal types of ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ are useful, 
namely, because they are able to capture these general observations in a manageable manner 
providing useful heuristic devices to approach the social phenomena under study. The next two 
sections present a series of examples as the most hand-ready evidence available to date about these 
recent transformations. Some of them are consolidated transformations, while others are still 
transformations on their way (recent initiatives and programmes). 
 
The main argument of this paper is that the widening and deepening of innovation policies since the 
mid 1990s raises important analytical questions about the extent to which the new approach actually 
contributes to an effective governance of the innovation system. This is so because the increased 
governmental activism and experimentalism does not automatically imply an improvement of the 
governance of institutional and organisational dimension of the system conducing to innovation. 
The point here is that the extent to which the widening and deepening of governmental intervention 
are in fact rendering the governance of the innovation system more effective (or not) is a matter of 
empirical investigation.  
 
On the face of it, the increased governmental activism and experimentalism has to do with the 
following governance issues. The widening and deepening of governmental action puts pressure to 
ensure the internal coherence and strategic dimension of public action, and in particular between the 
goals and the means, which have to be feasible and doable. Likewise, the virtual expansion of the 
number of policy instruments developed towards different dimensions of innovation policy renders 
the horizontal and vertical policy coordination an even more important matter than before because 
there are more topics, more initiatives and more goals to coordinate. Furthermore, and perhaps most 
importantly, in an expanded mode of policy intervention the question of how to strike the balance 
between (governmental) diversity creation and (market) selection in an innovation system becomes 
acute. When referring to the new, more complex forms of public action (the deepening), the new 
modes of public-private interaction might pose problems of defining clearly the risk-sharing and 
respective responsibility of partners in economic and in managerial terms. Likewise, issues of 
legitimacy and accountability in innovation policy-making might become more difficult to assign, 
let alone to enforce. Legitimacy and accountability is also an issue related to the increasing trends 
of functional delegation (to public agencies and other organisations) and territorial decentralisation 
(regionalisation, cluster initiatives) of innovation policy where issues of overall consistence and 
democratic control become crucial. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections are devoted to a careful characterisation of 
the widening and deepening trends respectively. Selected examples of policy initiatives serve to 
illustrate the different aspects and specific mechanisms through which innovation policies have 
been expanding their scope and transforming their approach. After that, the paper turns to the issue 
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of defining effective governance in a manageable way (our dependent variable), and of identifying 
the possible set of independent variables that might affect it. Drawing from a series of theoretical 
assumptions from the rich literature on governance, the paper develops a series of specific 
analytical guidelines and criteria for the study of to what extent the widened and deepened policy 
approach is contributing to an effective governance of the innovation system. 
 
2.- The Widening of Innovation Policy: Expanding the Scope of Public Action 
 
 
As hinted before, the widening of innovation policy refers to the gradual extension of the scope and 
the realm of this policy area. Since the mid 1990s and particularly since the 2000s, many 
governments have launched a series of public actions towards topics and areas that were not 
covered previously by the more traditional understanding of this policy. Since the post-World War 
era until the 1980s, most governments focused their sphere of action in the fields of science, 
research and industrial technology, primarily from a perspective of fostering knowledge production 
as such and product innovation in the manufacturing sectors. These historical policy paradigms 
where anchored in specific understandings of the innovation process and on the role of the 
government, as well as on its limits (Lundvall and Borrás 2005). Naturally, there have always been 
different national styles of policy-making in this field (Ergas 1987) (Laredo and Mustar 2001), 
however, some general paradigmatic shifts are identifiable through time in relation to changes in 
governmental cognitive backgrounds (Bozeman 2000). With the advent of the innovation system’s 
perspective in the early 1990s, the ‘innovation’ policy paradigm has been gradually widespread, 
moving beyond (but also encompassing) science, research, technology and development policy 
approaches. As mentioned above, the new perspective is far broader than before due to its 
institutional, evolutionary perspective, and due to its wider understanding of innovation as a social 
and economic phenomenon. 
  
This new understanding of innovation ushers in the widening of innovation policy in the sense that 
it expands the role of governments by addressing new issues. The most conspicuous issues are 
innovation in the service sector, user-driven innovation processes, culture-creative industries and 
the creative society, innovation for defence and security in a broad sense (not only military 
defence), innovation for poverty reduction, or innovation in territorial clusters. The next paragraphs 
provide examples of policy instruments and initiatives related to this widening. 
 
After more than one decade of scholarly attention to the sheer size of the service sector in 
developed and late-comer economies, and about the importance of innovation processes therein 
(Miles 2005), innovation policy-makers have recently come to grips with initiatives for fostering 
innovation in the service sector (Commission 2003; OECD 2005). The large diversity of the service 
sector, in terms of different types of services and in terms of the service-dimension of 
manufacturing sector, renders policy actions towards innovation in services a rather complex 
matter. Whereas most countries implicitly include the service sector in their innovation initiatives, it 
continues to be de facto excluded in manufacturing sector focused policy initiatives (den Hertog and 
Segers 2003). For that reason, it has been argued that there is a need to develop specific policy 
initiatives with a generic and horizontal nature addressing a wide variety of service-oriented firms 
(Rubalcaba 2006). Countries like Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Finland have recently launched 
such type of initiatives. The Finish ‘Serve’ programme offers an interesting case at stake because 
one of its four areas is devoted to the so-called knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), or 
expert firms that provide services and assistance to other firms, typically facilitating and stimulating 
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process and organisational innovation. Launched in 2006 by Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation, KIBS-related initiatives are proving to be particularly interesting to 
promote innovation in small firms located in remote regions, because traditionally these firms do 
not use KIBS (Toivonen 2007). 
 
Something similar is happening with the area of user-driven innovation. After several years of 
scholarly work on the importance of user-producer relations (Lundvall 1988) and of lead users (Von 
Hippel 1986) in the innovation process, policy-makers have recently started to pay attention to this. 
User-producer relations take place in a very large spectrum of product innovation, meaning that a 
wide range of industrial sectors actively use these relations in innovation management. One of the 
most salient examples of user-driven innovation policy initiatives is the programme with this name 
launched by the Danish government in 2007. The programme aims at bringing a new dimension to 
the involvement of lead users in innovation processes by strengthening the diffusion of user-driven 
innovation management methods. One of the most remarkable features of this programme is that it 
is directed towards private firms, as well as towards organisations in the public sector. Hence, this 
programme is also used to promote organisational and process innovation in the public sector. 
 
Another new area of action for innovation policy is innovation in the creative and culture industries. 
Innovation and creativity are largely related to each other. What is interesting however is the policy-
makers recent attention to the economic dimension of the later. Along with the scholarly debate 
about the importance of creativity and the creative class (Florida 2002), international organisations 
and national governments alike have devoted increasing interest on the economic and innovative 
capabilities of this traditionally disregarded sector (OECD 2000) (KEA 2006). The creative and 
culture industries include visual arts, performing arts, heritage, film, TV, radio, music, books, 
architecture and design sectors; however this definition tends to vary across countries. Two of the 
most advanced programmes for innovation in these industries have been put forward in Singapore 
and in the UK. The Singapore Ministry of Information, communication and the Arts launched the 
initiative ‘Creative Community Singapore’ in 2005, which is a quite open programme developed 
and run by a private-public consortium. The main aim of the Singapore programme is to foster 
entrepreneurship in the creative and cultural industries by bringing people together and providing 
specific forms of support. The UK ‘Creative Economy Programme’ is however far more ambitious. 
Launched in 2005 and revitalised in 2008 by the Brown government, this programme envisages a 
large variety of initiatives (DCMS 2008). Among others, the new strategy aims at stimulating 
apprenticeship in the sector, supporting research and development, stimulating entrepreneurship, 
supporting creative clusters by means of the Regional Development Agencies, and promoting the 
UK (London in particular) as a global hub for cultural and creative industry events.  
 
Using innovation policy for poverty reduction has become another new theme addressed by late-
comer and developing countries when dealing with their innovation policies. This probably has to 
do with the political debate around the UN millennium goals related to innovation policies (Juma 
and Yee-Cheong 2005), and the recent scholarly debates in the innovation policy literature about 
equality and socio-distributional issues (Cozzens 2007). Naturally, developing countries have 
always related innovation policies to their development targets. Traditionally, this has been done by 
promoting innovation in crucial sectors like agriculture and health. However, the direct link 
between innovation and poverty reduction is a relatively new phenomenon, indicating once more 
the gradual widening of the scope of innovation policy. One interesting example of this is the 
Technology and Innovation for Poverty Reduction Programme, put forward by the South African 
government in its innovation strategy of 2002. This was a rather small programme, which has not 
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been fully implemented (OECD 2007). Nevertheless, poverty reduction has come up again as a 
specific goal in the recent ten-year plan for innovation, which has envisaged some horizontal 
activities like the advance of social-sciences research on the topic, and more actively promoting 
knowledge application into poverty-related issues (DST 2008). 
 
Military defence has always been a central component of innovation policy in most countries. The 
novelty during the past few years is that the ‘anti-terrorism era’ has expanded significantly the way 
in which ‘defence’ and ‘security’ are being understood (James 2006). As a result, governments are 
currently expanding the reach of traditional military and defence R&D programmes to include more 
sophisticated knowledge, intelligence and ‘soft’ security know-how. One notable example of this is 
the KIRAS programme in Austria (2005-2013). In its general statement, the KIRAS programme 
states, ‘Security research has to be comprehended from national sight in terms of multidimensional, 
long reaching, multidisciplinary and integrative. Comprehensive security means the durable 
guarantee of a high level of life basis and possibilities of evolvement for all members of society’. 
Managed by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) KIRAS focuses on four support 
instruments, two of them rather conventional (R&D cooperative projects, and support of feasibility 
studies and demonstration projects), and two rather novel, namely, networking among national 
security research resources, and supporting accompanying measures linking the networks (above) 
with feasibility-demonstration projects. In other words, KIRAS aims at advancing a wider and more 
complex information and know-how exchange while linking it to conventional military research.  
 
Last but not least, the widening of innovation policy can be seen to relate to the increasing attention 
to territorial-related innovation processes. Admittedly, this has taken place gradually since the 
1980s, but with the advance of innovation-related paradigm and the subsequent rapprochement 
between science, technology and innovation policy, and with the recognition that knowledge and 
innovation are crucial elements for territorial economic development; most developed countries 
have increasingly regionalised their innovation policy. The regionalisation has assumed different 
forms depending on whether regions have developed and financed actively their own initiatives or 
they are passive in terms of implementing national initiatives through territorially decentralised 
national agencies (Perry and May 2007). Different examples of this are federal or quasi-federal 
systems like Germany (Edler and Kuhlmann 2008) and the EU (Edler, Kuhlman et al. 2003) (Borrás 
2003), as it is increasingly so for unitary political systems like the UK (Lyall 2007) and Japan 
(Kitagawa 2007). 
 
The regional dimension of innovation policy has followed different forms of multi-level governance 
in cooperative federal systems like Canada and Germany (Salazar and Holbrook 2007). What is 
perhaps interesting is that innovation-related policies towards clusters, the top-down and bottom-up 
dimensions are becoming more visible (Borrás and Tsagdis forthcoming 2008). Examples of 
countries with territorially decentralised innovation-related governmental initiatives are the 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Slovenia cluster policies (Boekholt and Thuriaux 1999). A 
good example of this is the recently launched ‘Top cluster competition’ initiative in Germany 
(2007-2011). In every round, this programme grants a large amount of resources (max. €200 million 
for five years) to few cluster proposals (max. five). Clusters are constituted groups of firms, 
research organisations, government authorities, NGOs, and the like aiming to promote the cluster by 
supporting skill development, research strategies, demonstration projects, and entrepreneurship. The 
top-down strong competition framework designed and funded by the German federal government 
matches with (the selected) bottom-up clusters’ own initiatives put forward by these self-constituted 
networks of innovation-oriented organisations. 
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Cities and local governments have also become increasingly pro-active actors in innovation and 
economic development strategies. This is currently combined with urban planning and city 
renovation strategies. Municipal areas (particularly cosmopolitan cities) are increasingly using their 
innovative environments as a strategic branding for attracting human and financial capital. A case at 
stake is the ‘22@Barcelona’ initiative, operating since 2005. This initiative aims at profiling 
Barcelona as an innovative hub and as the future ‘California’ of Europe. 
 
 
The above tells us that the widening of innovation policy has to do with the expansion of the notion 
of innovation, as much as with the expansion of the activism of different levels of government in 
this field of innovation (other than the traditional areas of science, research and technology policy).  
 
Table 1: Examples of newly widened initiatives in innovation policy 
 
Examples of newly widened policy initiatives 
 
Country of example 
Innovation in the service sector Finland 
User-driven innovation Denmark 
Creative and culture industries Singapore, UK 
Poverty reduction South Africa 
Expanded defence and security Austria 












The deepening of innovation policy refers to the use of new and more sophisticated forms of public 
intervention in this policy domain. Many governments have made a considerable effort during the 
past few years to develop new policy instruments and to improve existing ones. Entirely new 
initiatives, programmes, and schemes have been introduced in what seems to be a truly 
experimental mood in innovation policy instruments. Likewise, existing policy instruments have 
been revamped, transformed or renewed in important ways to fit new governmental goals and 
improve their expected impact. As mentioned in the introduction, to a very large extent these 
significant efforts are related to an increasing focus on the effects and forms of policy instruments 
from the part of governments. However, the deepening of innovation policy is also related to the 
fact that since the early 1990s, the forms of public action in developed countries have been 
changing in important ways along with New Public Management. Governments have re-organised 
the modes of public administration, reinterpreted the relation between the public and the private 
sectors, and introduced a series of novel forms of public action. Naturally, this has also affected 
innovation policy, not least by deepening its form of action. 
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Generally speaking, there are three large types of instruments used in public policy. These are 
regulatory instruments, economic and financial instruments, and soft instruments. This three-fold 
typology of policy instruments is what has popularly been identified as the ‘sticks’, the ‘carrots’ and 
the ‘sermons’ of public policy instruments (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist et al. 2003). Admittedly, there 
are alternative classifications of policy instruments (Linder and Peters 1998) (Hood and Margetts 
2007). However, the three-fold division used here remains the most accepted in the literature and 
continues to be the most widely used in practical contexts (Salamon 2002). Regulatory instruments 
using law and binding regulations are an important instrument in the field of innovation policy. This 
has to do primarily with several areas, like the regulation of intellectual property rights (in 
particular, but not only, patent regulations); the regulation of universities and public research 
organisations (most importantly the statutory nature of the organisations, and researchers’ 
employment regulations); competition (anti-trust) policy regulations concerning R&D and 
innovative activities by firms in the market; bioethics and other ethical regulations related to 
innovative activities; and last but not least, some specific industrial sector regulations with effects 
on innovative activities. In innovation policy, regulatory instruments are those affecting some 
fundamental ‘rules of the game’ for knowledge and innovation processes. Because regulations are 
obligatory, these rules of the game are compulsory and constitute an important dimension of the 
formal institutional set-up of a system of innovation.  
 
Regarding the second type of instruments, the economic instruments, science, technology and 
innovation policy has traditionally made an extensive use of these (Smits and Kuhlmann 2004). 
This is particularly the case for instruments stimulating positive incentives in cash and in kind. One 
of the most widely used instruments is ‘en bloc’ public support to research organisations, primarily 
universities and public research organisations. Other fundamental instruments using economic 
incentives are competitive research funding (industrial or basic research), tax incentives for R&D 
performed at firm level, support to technology transfer, and support to venture and seed capital. 
 
‘Soft instruments’ are our third grand type of instruments. They are characterised by being 
voluntary and non-coercive. This means that soft instruments do not use obligatory measures, 
sanctions or direct incentives or disincentives from the government. Instead, the soft instruments 
provide information and recommendations, make normative appeals, or offer voluntary or 
contractual agreements. The most widely used in the field of innovation policy are standards at the 
national or international level, codes of conduct for firms, universities or public research 
organisations, management contracts with public research organisations, public-private partnerships 
shearing costs, benefits and risks in the provision of specific public goods, or campaigns and public 
communication. Because innovation is a very complex phenomenon, the new instruments might be 
able to address different aspects of the innovation process and of the innovation system that the 
previous regulatory and economic instruments could not reach properly 
 
In the field of innovation there is a fourth type of policy instruments, namely, the meta-instruments. 
They are ‘meta-’ because they are not intended to modify some trends in the society and economy 
as such, as the three previous types of instruments do. Instead, meta-instruments are designed and 
used with the purpose of providing intelligence to the process of formulating innovation policy 
itself. Innovation indicators, policy benchmarks and technology foresight are the three most 
prominent examples of meta-instruments in this field. The Open Method of Coordination in the EU 
context, seeking to promote mutual learning and voluntary coordination through common 
benchmarks among Member States, is another prominent example (Kaiser and Prange 2004). 
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It is not adventurous to state that there have been significant advancements and transformations in 
the four types of instruments during the past few years. This has to do with a new understanding of 
the role of public action and the interaction between public and private actors in the provision of 
common goods, but also to the advancement of more detailed knowledge and analytical tools from 
the part of policy-makers. 
 
Some crucial regulatory instruments in innovation policy have been recently transformed in several 
countries, in what seems to be a new understanding of how these ‘rules of the game’ affect the 
innovation process, or can be used more strategically to foster it. A clear example of this is the 
reform of the EU law clauses granting exemptions on competition policy regulations concerning 
R&D agreements. With the new rules of 2000, the EU is said to have moved away from a legalistic 
approach on competition law towards an economic approach based on analysis of market impact of 
these types of agreements. In a nutshell, the new rules give a clear time limit to the cooperation 
between two or more firms for the joint research and development of a product, and they establish 
that the parties shall have a market share of less than 25 per cent. The most interesting aspect of the 
new rules is precisely their economic concern with the potential market dominance and lasting 
durability of large R&D alliances and their possible negative impact on innovation at large. This 
contrasts with the rules of the early 1980s, which were only focused on creating a legal space in 
anti-trust law for any kind of R&D agreements, and did not assume any possible negative effects in 
the innovation process (Borrás 2003). Another interesting example of changes in regulatory 
instruments is the important transformations in patent regulations during the past few years. Willing 
to foster ‘entrepreneurial universities’, some countries have followed the example of the US and 
eased the regulatory ways for universities to appropriate and exploit their knowledge production 
through university-owned patents. This regulation of university patents has in most cases meant the 
withdrawal of the so-called ‘professor privilege’ clauses (by which professors could own these 
patents), like for example in Germany, Denmark and Norway. Still being a contested measure in 
terms of its real effects (Iversen, Gulbrandsen et al. 2007), the case at point here is that innovation 
policy instruments are being transformed in significant ways.  
 
Economic instruments, for their part, continue to be the most widely used type of instruments in 
innovation policy. The general novelty since the mid 1990s is that these instruments have become 
more diversified, more sophisticated, have introduced elements of conditionality and market-driven 
principles, and have promoted new forms of public-private interaction. Starting with the first two 
remarks, the diversification and sophistication of economic instruments in innovation policy is 
almost visible everywhere. Traditional direct support measures have given way to new indirect 
support measures. One such indirect measure is, for example, public funds providing loans with 
interest rates below market prices to private venture capital firms, with the purpose of enhancing the 
availability of risk-willing capital, an essential factor for innovation. Likewise, more sophisticated 
policy instruments have been recently created. An interesting case is the French ‘mutual funds for 
innovation’ initiative (FCPI) created in 1997. This is an instrument that combines fiscal incentives 
and promotes risk sharing for innovative activities. Physical persons can make an important income 
tax reduction when buying shares of these funds. The Funds must invest at least 60% of their capital 
in innovative SMEs that are not listed in the stock exchange.  
 
As mentioned above, economic instruments of innovation policy have introduced elements of 
conditionality and market-driven principles. This is the most evident on the economic instruments 
traditionally used to support public research. The ‘en bloc’ endowments to the large national public 
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research organisations (PROs) have been recently diminished in a significant way in a drive to 
encourage these organisations to earn an increasing part of their budget from other sources of 
income, typically from public sources on a competitive basis or from private sources (Lepori, van 
den Besselaar et al. 2007). The increasing conditionality of PROs’ funding is largely related to a 
new set of socio-political expectations and understanding about the role of PROs in the innovation 
system (Krishna 2007). 
Soft instruments are the third type of innovation policy instruments, and they are ‘soft’ because they 
do not use coercion or economic incentives. Instead, they use voluntary means, advocating certain 
norms and exhorting to some specific form of action. These instruments are increasingly used in 
innovation policy. Some of the most notable examples are instruments fostering the creation of 
innovation networks. These instruments became rather popular in some countries during the 1990s. 
The newer versions of networking programmes are perhaps more focused thematically than before, 
and more aware of the need of solid managerial capacities for their success. The Business Angels’ 
Network is a programme launched by the Flemish government in Belgium in 2004. It provides 
support to a network of business angels, by informing, training and preparing them by informing 
and encouraging entrepreneurs, and by bringing those groups closer together. The biotech sector 
network initiative in Thailand is another case of targeted networking soft-instrument, combining 
economic incentives too (Dodgson, Mathews et al. 2008). In the UK, Freitas has identified no less 
than 81 different programmes aiming at fostering standards, best practices, managerial practices and 
other soft measures for improving the firms’ own innovation management capabilities, a great part 
of them being launched after the second half of the 1990s (Freitas 2007).  
 
Last but not least, during the past few years there has been a veritable surge in the use of meta-
instruments. A new range of innovation indicators have been developed not only in an international 
cross-country comparative basis (Bloch 2007), but also at a more local basis (Nauwelaers and 
Wintjes 2008). Likewise, the improvement of foresight and technological forecasting techniques 
have followed from a more intensive use of this meta-instrument in the strategic design of 
innovation policies in many countries (Harper, Cuhls et al. 2008). The large Prospectar foresight 
programme in Brazil is a good case at hand. Launched in 2001, the programme collected a vast 
amount of data for the purpose of help in identifying policy priorities, but also for a more 
widespread use of the findings by actors in the innovation system. As in other cases, the 
methodology used was largely adapted to the specific needs of the Brazilian innovation system 
(Zackiewicz, Albuquerque et al. 2005). In a sense, the extensive use of these meta-instruments can 
be associated to patterns of mutual learning across countries. This is particularly so in the explicit 










Table 2: Examples of deepened policy instruments in innovation policy. 
 
Type of policy instruments Examples of deepened policy 
instruments 
 
Country of example 
Regulatory instruments Competition regulations’ 
exemptions to R&D alliances 
 





US, Germany, Norway, 
Denmark 
Economic instruments Fiscal incentives – mutual 
funds for innovation 
 








Soft instruments Business angels’ network 
 
























4.- Widening and Deepening innovation policy: What impact on governance? 
 
The widening and deepening trends characterised above tend to illustrate an increased activism and 
experimentalism from the part of governments and a more assertive stance on innovation policy-
making. The main argument of this paper is that these two significant policy trends might be putting 
some pressure on the effective governance of the innovation system. This is related to what the 
MONIT project identified as the risk of fragmentation and lack of coherence (OECD 2005). Along 
with that, this paper argues that, while expanding and deepening its sphere and form of intervention, 
governments are putting forward new and more complex and diversified institutional frameworks 
for their innovation systems in their willingness to stimulate in novel ways innovation processes in 
their countries. Likewise, the expansion of governmental action is also typically accompanied by 
important organisational novelties, in most cases creating new organisations for the practical 
management of expanded governmental initiatives. These new widened and deepened innovation 
policy initiatives typically entail more complex and more diversified organisational set-ups. 
 
Complexity and diversity are not understood here in a negative sense; nor are they understood in a 
positive sense either. Rather, the extent to which the increased complexity and diversity of the 
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institutional frameworks and of the organisational set-ups deriving from a more pro-active and 
experimental governmental intervention towards fostering innovation is in fact rendering the 
governance of the system more effective (or not) is a matter of empirical investigation. This is to 
say that the governmental activism does not automatically mean a better or a worse governance of 
the system. It is an observable phenomenon, the effects of which need to be analysed. And in order 
to examine these effects on the governance of the system, the paper argues that it is necessary to 
look at the overall political conditions under which innovation policy is designed and executed.  
 
There is today a large literature dealing with innovation policy both in a direct way and in an 
indirect way. Whereas the former approach takes innovation policy as its main object of study, the 
later deals with policy in an indirect way when it discusses some general ‘policy implications’ 
stemming from studies about innovation processes. To be sure, these direct and indirect approaches 
in the literature have contributed in important ways to define crucial normative issues for policy-
makers. However, it is the literature directly dealing with innovation policy as such that has made 
the clearest analytical attempt to deal with the question of effectiveness. Three streams of this 
literature are worth referring to. 
 
The first is the stream of literature devoted to assessing the impact and evaluating the effectiveness 
of innovation policy programmes. There is today a veritably refined analytical toolbox and extended 
practices about innovation programmes’ evaluation, both for ex-post assessment (Shapira and 
Kuhlmann 2003) (Feller 2007) and increasingly so for ex-ante assessment (Delanghe and Muldur 
2007). This literature typically focuses on evaluating the impact (or the expected impact) of 
individual instruments, specific governmental programmes or schemes. These evaluation exercises 
bring about important lessons about the real effects of particular instruments of governmental 
action, providing crucial evidence-based information to policy makers.   
 
The second large stream of innovation policy literature deals with the identification of the areas that 
require governmental intervention. It is commonly accepted that when dealing with innovation 
process, there are no ready-made nor ‘one size fits all’ policy solutions (Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
This means that each individual innovation policy shall be defined so to find ways to solve the 
concrete problems faced by its particular innovation system. There are multiple ways of conducting 
a proper ‘diagnosis’ of an innovation system in terms of identifying bottlenecks and problems. 
Perhaps the most widespread is the ‘system failure’ approach, which goes beyond the theoretically 
inspired ‘market failures’ from the neo-classical economic paradigm. Initially identifying three 
possible systemic failures (organisational, institutional and interactions failures) (Edquist 2001), the 
list has been gradually expanded to include further failures like infrastructure and capabilities 
failures (Woolthius and Lankhuizen 2005), also in the context of regional innovation systems 
(Prager 2007). 
 
The third stream of innovation policy literature directs its attention to the innovative capabilities at 
the firm level and the way in which public action (shall) enhances these. Teece’s suggestion that 
firms are able to profit from innovation if they have access to specialised and complementary assets 
implies that innovation policy should focus on maintaining those complementary assets in the 
manufacturing sector, particularly the protection of intellectual property (Teece 1986). Recent work 
along these lines emphasises venture capital and technology-transfer as other important 
complementary assets (Chesbrough, Birkinshaw et al. 2006). Following this firm-based perspective, 
Dodgson and Bessant observe that most innovation policies in developed countries are focused on 
firms’ resources (meaning the static tangible/intangible assets of a firm) rather than on firms’ 
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innovative capabilities (such as the dynamic organisational abilities of a firm) (Dodgson and 
Bessant 1996). Since innovative capabilities in firms are the triggering factors in the innovation 
process, the core purpose of innovation policy shall be on building innovative capabilities in firms. 
The authors go further on that path suggesting that policy initiatives creating different ‘innovation 
agents’ (mediating and facilitating such innovative capabilities) are at the end of the day the key to 
successful innovation policy. 
 
The literature mentioned above provides suggestive approaches about the effectiveness of 
innovation policy. Their focus on policy instruments’ impact assessment, identification of systemic 
failures and firm-based access to complementary assets/innovative capabilities offers interesting 
analytical frameworks and insights that are highly valuable for policy-makers. However, to the 
extent that the current trends of widening and deepening are incrementally and steadily redefining 
the scope and form of action of innovation policy, these approaches seem to be poorly equipped to 
examine the political conditions under which innovation policy can actually contribute to an  
effective governance of the innovation system. For that to be the case, we need a single analytical 
framework able to study these political conditions, and to examine to what extent the recent 
governmental activism and experimentalism in innovation policy contributes to an effective 
governance of the system. 
 
 
5.- Governance, institutions and innovation policy  
 
 
The term ‘governance’ has received an astonishing deal of attention among scholars and policy-
makers during the last decade or so. In spite of this widespread use in academia and in political 
documents, the conceptual definition of this notion remains still rather vague. Mark Bevir provides 
the following general perspective: ‘The term governance can be used specifically to describe 
changes in the nature and role of the state following the public sector reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s. Typically, these reforms are said to have led to a shift from a hierarchic bureaucracy toward 
a greater use of markets, quasi-markets, and networks, especially for the delivery of public services. 
The effects of the reforms were intensified by global changes, including an increase in transnational 
economic activity and the rise of regional institutions such as the European Union (EU). So 
understood, governance expresses a widespread belief that the state increasingly depends on other 
organizations to secure its intentions, deliver its policies, and establish a pattern of rule.’ (Bevir 
2007): 364. Bevir’s account of ‘governance’ refers to the specific historical situation of changed 
state-society interactions that follows from a set of political and administrative events. This 
understanding tends to reflect a ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the liberal reforms of the state pursued in the 
1980s in the Anglo-Saxon world, and in the 1990s in other parts of the developed and developing 
world. 
 
Other scholars, typically from the German tradition, relate the notion governance to more general 
aspects of contemporary post-war state-society relations, not necessarily referring to the specific 
events and reforms of the 1980s/90s (Benz 2008 forthcoming). Their approach relates governance 
to the set of different possible forms of coordinating collective action. Governance can assume 
many different modes, depending on where the actors interact with each other and with the state in 
hierarchical, network, or in competitive modes. Governance is hierarchical when the state 
coordinates social interactions by coercive, obligatory and non-competitive means. Likewise, 
governance assumes a network-based mode when social actors and organisations interact with each 
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other and with the state in a more heterarchical manner, meaning on a more equal footing based on 
mutual-dependency. And governance is competitive when actors interact with each other in a 
market-based form, typically associated with liberalisation and privatisation of 
activities/organisations performed/owned by the state. Most scholars agree that these three modes of 
governance rarely exist in pure forms and are separated from the other. Indeed, growing evidence 
from empirical work tends to show that in different policy areas the modes of governance are 
typically found in specific combinations with one another. 
 
Two central tenets of the governance approach (in both its Anglo-Saxon and German traditions) are 
that the state-society relations are changing and becoming more complex and interrelated; and that 
the backbone of governance is the set of formal and informal institutions, defining the different 
modes of coordination and interaction between the state and the society. In a sense, institutions are 
perceived as the ‘atoms’ of the different modes of governance. Formal institutions refer typically to 
regulations, prescribed patterns of interaction, and explicitly (and typically also exogenously) 
defined ‘rules of the game’. Informal institutions are those routines, habits, and practices that reflect 
implicit (and also typically endogenously) defined ‘rules of the game’. Together, formal and 
informal institutions form the institutional framework where actors (individuals and organisations) 
operate. In a sense, formal institutions can be seen as the fruit of purposive public action in the 
attempt to shape socio-economic actors behaviour. But these can be seen as well (at least in 
democratic political systems) as the result of formalising norms, principles and values contained in 
informal institutions. Hence, the institutional framework is at the same time shaping and expressing 
the way in which actors and organisations interact with each other.  
 
In the field of innovation, the question about effective governance is a question about how 
governmental action is steering the interactions of actors taking place in the innovation system. 
Hence, the dependent variable of this study, effective governance, can be defined as the successful 
steering of the actors’ interactions in the innovation system in a way that it supports the desired 
innovative dynamics in the economy and society. More precisely, since innovation policy is the 
main mechanism through which steering takes, place, ‘successful steering’ has to do with the 
effectiveness of three key aspects of innovation policy, namely, its effective coordination, its 
suitability, and its reflexivity. 
 
As mentioned before, effective coordination is a key aspect of effective governance because the 
governance of the innovation system has to do with the alignment of the different actors 
(individuals, firms, organisations) in the system. The governmental action of innovation policy is of 
paramount importance to ensure this alignment. Hence, effective governance in terms of effective 
coordination refers to the ability of innovation policy to bring together and to organize coherently 
the interactions of the actors in the system.  
 
The suitability of public action is another key aspect of effective governance, referring naturally to 
the way in which governments deal with the overall contents of their intervention. This refers not 
only to the appropriateness and complementarity of the individual policy instruments deployed, but 
also to the overall style of public intervention and its ultimate degree of aptness to the innovation 
system’s problems. Hence, effective governance in terms of suitability refers to the extent to which 
innovation policy is actually covering the policy needs of the system. 
 
Last but not least, the third key aspect of effective governance as successful steering is reflexivity. 
This has to do with the social nature of the innovation process, and the ultimate political choices 
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related to the forms of steering according to the specific ‘desired innovative dynamics in the 
economy’. Hence, effective governance in terms of reflexivity refers to the degree to which 
innovation policy is actually articulating and expressing the collective aim of the actors’ in the 
innovation system. 
 
Having defined the three aspects of ‘effective governance’, the next section elaborates an analytical 
framework based on a series of conditions that might affect it.  
 
 
6.- The conditions for effective governance: An analytical tool box 
 
On the basis of the above, the effective governance of a system of innovation as successful steering 
is characterized by the effective coordination, suitability and reflexivity of innovation policy. Thus, 
the question that raises at these stage is, what are the conditions under which we can assume that 
such effective governance is likely to emerge? In other words, what are the possible independent 
variables associated to the successful (or unsuccessful) steering, understood as effective 
coordination, suitability and reflexivity? In the following, seven political conditions are identified as 
possible relevant independent variables explaining effective governance of the innovation system 
(or the lack thereof). These are, a strategic innovation policy, a positive administrative coordination 
of innovation policy at the middle-level of executive departments, a rapid adaptation of the formal 
institutional framework, a balanced diversity creation and market selection, a clear distribution of 
roles between public and private actors, policy learning, and public legitimacy and accountability. 
The seven conditions and their analytical criteria are based on a series of explicit theoretical 
assumptions amenable for parsimonious empirical testing explained below. They are summarized in 
table 3. 
 
The first condition for effective governance of the innovation system is the existence of a strategic 
innovation policy. There is today a general understanding that governmental action towards 
innovation needs to be strategic. This is so because a strategic innovation policy provides a political 
vision about goals and the specific directions for the system, but also, and perhaps most 
importantly, because strategic innovation policy provides the basis for priority-setting of 
governmental action (Borrás, Chaminade et al. 2008 forthcoming). The assumption is that, to be 
effective, these two elements, namely, political vision and priority setting, are anchored at least in 
one approach to the system’s diagnosis (systemic failures; firms’ access to complementary assets; 
or firms’ innovative capabilities). Yet, the analytical criterion is not only how clearly visions and 
priorities are defined, but also how these two elements are in fact reflected in the actual definition 
and implementation of the policy instruments. One might find situations where a political vision has 
been put forward by a series of official political documents setting direction and defining priorities, 
but that this is not reflected in the actual design and implementation of innovation policy 
instruments. In such a situation the political vision and priority setting runs the risk of becoming a 
symbolic signalling device rather than a political tool. The recent governmental activism and 
experimentalism expressed in the incremental widening and deepening of innovation policy during 
the past few years, is not automatically generating an overall sense of direction for the innovation 
system or securing a strategic choice, design and implementation of innovation policy instruments. 
Hence, an explicit political vision and priority-setting, together with its transposition in the actual 
work of policy instruments are two criteria for an effective governance of the innovation system.  
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The second condition for effective governance is the existence of a positive administrative policy 
coordination at the middle level of executive departments. Following the MONIT project about 
governance and coordination (OECD 2005), administrative policy coordination can be understood 
mainly as the complementarity of different governmental actions reducing redundancy and 
generating synergetic effects among these governmental actions. This refers mainly to how the 
administrative and organisational interactions across different sectoral ministries (horizontal 
coordination) and different levels of government (vertical coordination) are designed and enforced. 
Since innovation policy (now more than ever) expands over traditional sectoral boundaries of 
different ministries (education, research, industry/economy, health, defence, environment, and all 
the examples of widening mentioned above), and since more and more levels of government are 
involved in a wide array of innovation policy-related initiatives, it is not farfetched to assume that 
horizontal and vertical administrative coordination is a necessary condition for effective 
governance. As Braun mentions, the coordination can take form of negative coordination (namely, a 
non-cooperative form of relatively spontaneous coordination among administration units) and a 
form of positive coordination (namely, an explicit cooperative form of coordination among 
administration units) (Braun 2008). Since the widening of innovation policy renders the boundaries 
of this governmental interaction blurred and potentially exposed to redundancies and lack of 
synergetic effects, it is expected that effective governance is linked to the existence of positive 
coordination (explicit and co-operative form of coordination). The criteria for investigating this will 
be to examine two issues, namely, the existence of explicit mechanisms of coordination and the 
existence of patterns of actor’s interactions explicitly conducive to reduce redundancies and 
enhance complementarity and synergy of governmental actions.  
 
The third condition for effective governance is related to the existence of an innovation policy 
stimulating a rapid adaptation of formal institutions. The interactions among the actors in the 
innovation system are largely shaped by formal institutional frameworks (which are official and 
compulsory, typically of legal nature) and by informal institutional frameworks (which are 
spontaneous and self-defined, typically unspoken norms and routines). We can assume that when 
innovation policy contributes to an effective governance of the system when it is able to stimulate a 
rapid adaptation of the formal institutional framework in a way that is conducive to the desired 
levels and patterns of innovative performance in the economy. Evolutionary and institutional 
economists have generally understood the change in the innovation system to be a co-evolutionary 
process of transformation in the technology, the industrial structure and the supporting institutions 
of the system (Nelson 1994). These supporting institutions are the formal ‘rules of the game’, the 
formal institutional framework shaped by the governmental action. Hence, from this it can be 
assumed that that effective governance of the innovation system (achieving the desired levels and 
patterns of innovative performance) is highly related to the adaptation (indeed the rapid adaptation) 
of the formal institutional framework, in a way that eases and stimulates new forms of actor’s 
interactions, which in the long term will facilitate a true co-evolution mentioned above. A rapid 
adaptation of the formal institutional framework in a country is largely associated to the notion of 
‘institutional competitiveness’ in comparative political economy studies (Campbell and Pedersen 
2007). 
 
The fourth condition for effective governance has to do with the balance between diversity creation 
(typically enhanced by governmental action) and market selection in the innovation system. This is 
crucial for the suitability of innovation policy in the innovation system. Evolutionary economists 
have underlined repeatedly that the innovation process is the creation of knowledge diversity 
followed by the selection of that knowledge carried on by market dynamics (Nelson 1995). As 
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Metcalfe wisely points out, at the end of the day, the aim of policy is to raise the incentives to 
innovation by facilitating connections to a suitably rich knowledge ecology, whereas the market 
makes the selection process (Metcalfe 2007). The recent widening and deepening innovation policy 
means a rather pro-active governmental stance on knowledge production and diffusion because 
governments are providing an increasing number of incentives (direct and indirect) to create more 
diversity in the innovation system (more knowledge production, more diffusion of this knowledge, 
etc). The question is the extent to which market mechanisms are left to perform the necessary 
selection process that shall follow from that increased diversity. From this perspective, effective 
governance has to do with striking a balance between both dimensions. In less developed countries, 
governmental activism might be more necessary in terms of securing the creation of that knowledge 
diversity, than in developed countries, where such diversity already exists. Nonetheless, in both 
cases they have to keep a balance between both, which essentially implies two issues. The first issue 
is that governmental action does not generate more diversity than the innovation system can deal 
with. This has to do not only with the principle of additionality (public incentives shall not 
substitute private investment), but also with the fact that too many incentives in too many directions 
might not be able to generate the necessary kind of diversity, let alone an eventual selection process. 
Hence the assumption is that an effective governance of the system is associated with an 
enforcement of the principle of additionality by a prudent diversity creation. The second issue has to 
do with the governmental action securing incentives for market selection process. This naturally 
comes from the premise that the market selection process ensures a dynamic and efficient allocation 
of resources in the economy and in the innovation process.  
 
The fifth condition for effective governance has to do with the suitability of the actors’ role in the 
system. In a context of increased governmental activism and experimentalism in terms of new 
forms of public-private interaction, the point at stake is how the roles and distribution of risks 
between public and private actors in complex public-private interactions are defined. Innovation is 
an activity with a high level of uncertainty and risk. The serendipity in knowledge production and 
its commercial exploitation together with its public good nature have the tendency to reduce the 
incentives to conduct innovation. This is the reason why governments’ actions have traditionally 
aimed at enhancing these incentives to conduct innovation, by stimulating the framework conditions 
and by actively supporting processes of knowledge creation (see above). During the past few years, 
along with the advent of network-like modes of governance, many governmental actors have 
developed new forms of interaction with private actors. Many of these new public-private forms of 
interaction are in the ‘grey zone’ between the two positions in a continuum of state-led or market-
led innovative activities. The way in which risk is distributed in this ‘grey zone’ is paramount for an 
effective governance of this increased governmental activism. Effective governance is related to at 
least two issues. Firstly, it is related to the formalised contractual agreement between the public and 
private partners attributing a clear distribution of risks. The assumption is that the clearer the terms 
of this distribution, the lesser the potential conflicts between the partners and the more effective 
governance. Note that public actors might well assume high levels of risk. The point is that the 
distribution of that risk is foreseen and explicitly negotiated between the partners beforehand. The 
second issue refers to the degree of conditionality of public involvement and its economic 
contribution. The assumption is that the higher the degree of conditionality of public contribution, 
the clearer the targets of the public actor and the more stringent governance of the public-private 
interaction.   
 
The sixth condition for effective governance has to do with policy learning. Learning is crucial for 
the effectiveness of innovation policy because it deals with the reflexive dimension of governance. 
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Policy learning refers here to the reflexive process through which public actors take stock of past 
initiatives and elaborate on future activities in a way that they are ready to adapt constantly the 
policy initiatives and activities to ever changing needs of firms and other innovators in the 
innovation system. From the point of view of our current ambition of providing a set of analytical 
tools to study the effectiveness of governance, policy learning becomes a central topic to study. 
Learning is indeed a central topic to study given the recent trends of widening and deepening 
innovation policy. The increased number of policy instruments and the expansion of the areas 
covered by innovation policy require an explicit adaptive capability of policy-making. This relates 
to two essential features of innovation policy-making. Firstly, it relates to policy-makers’ active 
development and use of meta-instruments. As mentioned above, meta-instruments are instruments 
designed to provide specific reflexive tools for innovation policy making, in terms of assessing 
previous initiatives and providing advanced intelligence for policy-making. The assumption is that 
the use of these meta-instruments provides essential insights to adaptive policy-making. Secondly, 
learning relates to the explicit openness of policy-makers to ‘take on board the lessons’ from 
successes and failures of own and of other’s policy experiences. This openness relates not only to 
the general attitude of policy-makers, but most importantly to an active participation in existing 
(national and or international) learning platforms (Malik and Cunningham 2006). The assumption is 
that true learning processes take place when policy-makers are seriously following up and actively 
engaged in these experience exchange activities. 
 
Last, but not least, the seventh condition for effective governance has to do with the public 
legitimacy of innovation policy. The allegedly ‘technocratic’ nature of innovation policy has been 
challenged during the past decades by social and political uneasiness on topics like stem cell 
research, software patents regulations, or the risks associated with the release of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). The innovation process is a complex social and economic process. 
This means that the social sustainability of that innovation process is inevitably associated with the 
way in which popular criticism and concerns about innovation-related phenomena are politically 
dealt with (Borrás 2006) (Van Asselt and Vos 2008). Hence it can be assumed that the effective 
governance of the innovation system depends on the way in which the actual innovation policy-
making is legitimate. This in turn depends on how social concerns and considerations about 
innovation-related matters are channelled in the political system, and the extent to which these are 
subject to political accountability. Hence, the analytical criteria are essentially two. Firstly, the 
existence of mechanisms for popular participation in innovation-related policy-making. Such 
mechanisms shall be well endowed in terms of organisational assets, but also in terms of 
independent scientific information. These participatory mechanisms are not substituting 
conventional democratic representative channels. Rather, they are complementing and supporting 
them. Secondly, there has to be evidence of a high level of political accountability related to 
innovation issues, in the sense of an explicit political responsiveness and responsibility to these 
sensitive matters. 
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Table 3: The conditions for effective governance and their analytical 
criteria
Conditions for effective governance Analytical criteria 
A strategic innovation policy 
 The existence of an explicit political vision 
and priority-setting 
 Evidence that the vision and priorities are 
transposed to the choice, design and 
implementation of innovation policy 
instruments 
A positive administrative coordination of 
innovation policy at the middle level of executive 
departments 
 The existence of explicit and co-operative 
mechanisms of vertical and horizontal 
coordination  
 Evidence of clear patterns of actor’s 
interactions explicitly conducive to reduce 
redundancies and enhance 
complementarity and synergy of 
governmental actions 
A rapid adaptation of the formal institutional 
framework in the innovation system 
 Evidence that the formal institutional 
framework is adapting rapidly  
 Evidence that recent adaptations in the 
formal institutional framework have been 
conducive to the desired levels and patterns 
of innovative performance 
A balanced diversity creation and market selection 
 The enforcement of the principle of 
additionality by prudent diversity creation. 
 Evidence that governmental action secures 
incentives for market selection process  
A clear distribution of roles between public and 
private actors 
 Extended formalised contractual agreement 
between partners in complex and ‘grey’ 
zone of public-private partnerships 
 Evidence of conditionality of public 
involvement in these types of public-private 
interactions 
Policy learning 
 Policy-makers’ active development and use 
of meta-instruments 
 Policy-makers’ active participation in 
learning platforms  
Public legitimacy and accountability 
 Existence of well-endowed participatory 
frameworks in the innovation policy-making 
process complementing formal democratic 
channels 
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